



# Advanced Threat Modeling

A 50 Minute Session



**cigital**

Software Confidence. Achieved.

*John Steven*  
Software Security Principal  
Technical Director  
Office of the CTO  
Cigital Inc.

# The many faces of threat modeling

- What is a threat?
- Who builds a threat model?
- What are its critical elements?
- Who consumes it?
  - For what?




# A Few Words on STRIDE

- A conceptual checklist
  - Backed by DFDs
- Given our previous slide, what's good? What's bad?



# An Example DFD



# Use Threat Modeling to Identify...

- Where potential threats exist relative to the architecture
- How threats escalate privilege
  - ...become more formidable
- Specify vectors of attack
- Identifies components and assets worth protecting

... Ties technical risk & business assets to application design;


...Ties attacks to role, privilege, and capability;

...Drives security analysis, testing.



# The visual elements

**Threat**



**Asset under attack**



**Attack vector**



# Sensitive Data Analysis

# Sensitive data analysis and the human factor



cigital



# Example: Design for Sensitive Information

- *Steal credentials or secrets embedded in the client*
  - *Read client-cached values, even from different users*
- Example: Build a web-based customer service application:
  - Supports: account maintenance, password reset, etc.
  - Customer identified by Social Security Number (SSN)
  - Customer has a password for web application




# Example Application Flow Begins

The diagram illustrates the initial steps of an application flow. It starts with a 'Customer Identification' form where the user enters their last name as 'Steven' and selects '105 Mirror Way' from a dropdown address list. A red arrow indicates the transition to the 'Verify Customer SSN' form, where the user's name is now 'John Steven', the address is '105 Mirror Way', and the SSN is '202-58-8385'. Both forms include 'Cancel' and 'Continue' buttons.

- “What’s your last name Sir?”
- “Verify your address.”
- “For security purposes, verify the last four digits of your social security number.”

# What does that imply about data in this system?



In what zones (by number) is what information present?  
What design problems have we created for ourselves?

What are we going to do about it?

# What kinds of users do these messages help?

The image shows a screenshot of an Apache Tomcat error report. The report is displayed in a browser window with the title "Apache Tomcat/4.1.24 - Error report - Mozilla Firefox". The main content of the report is as follows:

```
HTTP Status 500 -  
type Exception report  
message  
description The server encountered an internal error () that prevented it from fulfilling  
exception  
javax.servlet.ServletException: Servlet execution threw an exception  
    at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter  
    at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter (App1  
    at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke (Standard
```

The stack trace for the ServletException is:

```
javax.servlet.ServletException: No data found  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.PageContextImpl.handlePageException (PageContextImpl  
    at jsp.dbtest._0002fjap_0002fdtest_0002fTMP_00031hmxj_0003fgo_0003fa_0002ejsp'  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.HttpJspBase.service (HttpJspBase.java:126)  
    at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service (HttpServlet.java:853)  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspServletWrapper.service (JspServletWrapper.java:6  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspServletWrapper.service (JspServletWrapper.java:6  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspServletWrapper.service (JspServletWrapper.java:6  
    at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service (HttpServlet.java:853)  
    at org.apache.tomcat.core.ContainerWrapper.service (ContainerWrapper.java:126)  
    at org.apache.tomcat.core.ContainerWrapper.service (ContainerWrapper.java:126)  
    at org.apache.tomcat.service.StandardWrapperValve.invoke (StandardWrapperValve  
    at org.apache.tomcat.service.StandardWrapperValve.invoke (StandardWrapperValve  
    at java.lang.Thread.run (Thread.java:619)
```

The stack trace for the SQLException is:


```
Root cause:  
java.sql.SQLException: No data found  
    at sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcStatement.executeQuery (JdbcOdbcStatement.java:126)  
    at sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcStatement.executeQuery (JdbcOdbcStatement.java:126)  
    at sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcStatement.executeQuery (JdbcOdbcStatement.java:126)  
    at sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcStatement.executeQuery (JdbcOdbcStatement.java:126)  
    at sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcStatement.executeQuery (JdbcOdbcStatement.java:126)  
    at sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcStatement.executeQuery (JdbcOdbcStatement.java:126)  
    at jsp.dbtest._0002fjap_0002fdtest_0002fTMP_00031hmxj_0003fgo_0003fa_0002ejsp'  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.HttpJspBase.service (HttpJspBase.java:126)  
    at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service (HttpServlet.java:853)  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspServletWrapper.service (JspServletWrapper.java:6  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspServletWrapper.service (JspServletWrapper.java:6  
    at org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspServletWrapper.service (JspServletWrapper.java:6  
    at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service (HttpServlet.java:853)  
    at org.apache.tomcat.core.ContainerWrapper.service (ContainerWrapper.java:126)  
    at org.apache.tomcat.core.ContainerWrapper.service (ContainerWrapper.java:126)  
    at org.apache.tomcat.service.StandardWrapperValve.invoke (StandardWrapperValve  
    at org.apache.tomcat.service.StandardWrapperValve.invoke (StandardWrapperValve  
    at java.lang.Thread.run (Thread.java:619)
```



# Users often make bad decisions




# Build Trust Zones into the Application




- Why should sensitive information leave the marked high-trust zone?
  1. The customer knows their SSN, don't present them with it
  2. The CSR should ask for and enter the SSN, not be presented with it
  3. Use programmatic means to verify SSN in the application server

# What That Might Look Like



# Using Structure to Separate Privilege





# Threat Modeling: Methodology

# Anchor in Software Architecture

Consider where attacks occur

Top-down


- Enumerate business objects
  - Sensitive data
  - Privileged functionality

Bottom-up


- Enumerate application entities
  - Sensitive data
  - Privileged functionality

Look for

- Middleware
- Open source
- Frameworks



# Identify Critical Application Assets



## Identify

- Sensitive data
- Privileged function

What would trust zones look like?

## Look out for:

- Proxies, facades, etc.
- Services: ws-, beans, etc.
- UI vs. implementation
- Aggressive caching schemes



digital

# Anchor Threats in Use Cases

Consider attack surface

- Actors become Threats
- Use becomes misuse

Top-down


- Enumerate elements closest to Threat actors

Bottom-up

- Think like code analysis tool

Look for:

- Interfaces, services
- Systems, Proxies
- Middleware
- Inputs (of any kind)



# Start with 'high value' Attack Vectors

Annotating with initial attacks

- Select a target objective
- Chose attacks that bridge gap

Top-down


- Pilfer community resources

Bottom-up


- Conceive properties an unknown attack might have

Look for:

- Assets close to surface
- Shortest paths
- Attacks that target tiers



# Example #1: Threats Facing Web Authentication




# More Advanced Threat Modeling Techniques



cigital

# Tips & Tricks #1: Threat Privilege Escalation




- Integrate with entitlement specification
  - Show escalation of privilege
  - Motivate probability of 'insider' attack




# Privilege Escalation: How to do it.

- Tackle each escalation separately
- Don't duplicate work
  - Steal this escalation for your T.M. "cookbook"
  - Ignore escalation through esoteric means at first
- Consider social, physical means where simpler than software-based attacks
  - Password reset
  - Stolen fobs
  - Phishing




# Overcoming Objections




- Remember:
  - Focus on common, simple attacks
  - Escalation to admin/LAN credential possible where credential stores reside in site database
  - 'insiders' need not be

# Tips #2: Target Using Layered Attacks



- Bootstrap later attacks with those that 'deliver'
  - Use one layer to exploit another (net, app)
  - Combine attacks to reach desired target

# Tips #3: Filling the Gaps...



■ How do we design tests to fill this gap?



# Take Homes

- Base Threat Model in *software architecture*
- When specific *use (cases)* and high-level architecture are defined:
  - Inventory roles, entitlements, if one doesn't exist
  - Inventory assets: sensitive data, privileged components
- Enumerate initial *attack vectors*
  - Use common 'low-hanging' fruit
- Elaborate more attacks
  - Find opportunities for privilege escalation
  - Layer attacks to target or 'hop' to assets
  - Fill in gaps by 'inventing' attacks
- Use Threat Modeling to drive security testing:





# For More

- Cigital's Software Security Group invents and delivers Software Quality Management
- See the Addison-Wesley Software Security series
- What areas are you interested in?

*“So now, when we face a choice between adding features and resolving security issues, we need to choose security.”*

-Bill Gates



# Thank you for your time

**John Steven**

[jsteven@cigital.com](mailto:jsteven@cigital.com)

[www.cigital.com](http://www.cigital.com)

[info@cigital.com](mailto:info@cigital.com)

+1.703.404.9293



**cigital**

Software Confidence. Achieved.



cigital